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Currency Inconvertiblity, Trade Taxes and Smuggling
ABSTRACT
In the classic analysis of smuggling importers choose the optimal mix of
legal and illegal trade, given trade taxes and the technology of detection.
This paper introduces an inconvertible currency in the framework, so that
illegal trade is valued at a rate higher than the (fixed) official exchange
rate. Sections 1 and 2 show how the smuggling ratio and the domestic price
markup for the import and export good are simultaneously determined.
With balanced legal and illegal trade, changes in the (long-run) black
market premium are a weighted average of changes in trade taxes, whereas
changes in the smuggling ratios depend on the ratio of trade taxes. Thus, an
import tariff and an export subsidy rising at the same rate would keep
smuggling ratios constant but imply a rising black market premium (section 3
and 4).
To determine the quantity of exports and imports, a model of the economy
is presented in section 5, featuring the production of exports and non-traded
goods and the consumption of imports and non-traded goods, as well as a
government confiscating the amounts of traded goods unsuccessfully smuggled.
Then export production may fall, and welfare may rise, if trade taxes have a
ne9ative effect on the relative price of exports and imports stronger than the
positive effect on smuggled exports and imports, which is always
welfare-reducing.
Section 6 introduces the short-run determination of the black market
premium via portfolio balance. In this case, rising rade taxes may be
associated with a premium rising even faster if there is unreported capital
flight and conversely.
Jorge Braga de Macedo
UWL -NewUniversity of Lisbon
Campo Grande, 185
1700 Lisbon, PortugalIntroduction
There has been a revival of interest in the consequences of currency
inconvertibility and the existence of black markets for foreign exchange.
Nevertheless, these widespread phenomena have been analyzed in isolation. In
particular, their relationship with trade taxes and smuggling has been largely
ignored in recent contributions. The model of Pitt (1984) hides the special
risks involved in smuggling behind an arbitrary "smuggling function". This is
recognized in the "crime-theoretic" smuggling model of Martin and Panagariya
(1984) but it does not feature a black market for foreign exchange. This
paper addresses the relationship between these two channels of illegal
activity in a framework inspired by the classic analysis of Beccaria (1764).
Beccaria looked at a case where the probability of detection in import
smuggling was exogenously given and he showed that importers would be
indifferent between smuggling and legal trade when the tariff factor (one plus
the tariff rate) equals the inverse of the probability of success. If this
were one, for example, any tariff would induce smuggling. How much of the
tariff revenue should be devoted to increased supervision, so as to lower the
probability of success, was in fact Beccaria's main concern.
Here we focus on the choice of the importer or exporter, but it is useful
to generalize slightly Beccaria's analysis as a motivation. Suppose the
smuggled imports have to be paid for with black market foreign exchange (which
for simplicity can be acquired at no risk), then a tariff lower than the
premium of the black market over the official market would not induce
smuggling even if the probability of success were one. The import tariff is-2-
now the upper bound for the black market premium and the indifference point
for the importer is defined by the equality of the tariff factor and the black
market premium over the probability of success. Conversely, if the black
market rate is lower than the official rate times the export tax factor, then
it will not pay to smuggle exports even if the probability of success were
one. The export tax is the lower bound of the black market premium.
Importers and exporters will therefore be indifferent between the two channels
when the ratio of trade taxes times the product of the probability of success
in import and export smuggling equals one. This may be thought of as a simple
generalization from Beccaria's formula, based on a given probability of
success in smuggling.
If the probability of success is endogenously determined, importers and
exporters will take this into account in choosing their mix of smuggling and
legal trade. Take the case where success is a negative function of the ratio
of smuggling to legal trade. Then equating marginal revenue to marginal cost
in both activities will determine the equilibrium price and smuggling ratio
for importers and exporters, given trade taxes and the black market premium.
Indeed, the ratio of domestic to free-trade prices will be a weighted average
of trade taxes and the premium. The import price markup will lie between the
tariff factor and the premium, and the export price markup will lie between
the premium and the export tax.
The determination of the long-run black market premium follows from the
identification of flow supply of and demand for black market foreign exchange.
When the short-run premium is given by portfolio balance, then, we can trace
the dynamics of the black market premium and analyze the relationship between—3—
smuggling and the black market for foreign exchange.
The problem of importers and exporters is described as a choice of the
relative magnitudes of legal trade and smuggling, much like the problem of
choosing an optimal portfolio of assets. From the solutions presented in
Sections 1 and 2, a flow model of the black market for foreign exchange is
derived in Section 3 and the effect of trade taxes discussed in Section 4.
This is embedded in Section 5 in a model of the rest of the economy in the
spirit of Jones (1974). Section 6 reinterprets the flow model as the long—run
solution of a portfolio model of the Kouri (1983) variety.
1.The Importer
Consider a price-taking importer who chooses the amount of a good to be
imported legally (denoted by Lm) and the amount to be smuggled (denoted by
Sm)• In the first case, he must pay an ad valorem tariff (tm1)p* but obtains
the foreign exchange at the official exchange rate .Inthe second case, he
must buy the foreign exchange in the black market at a rate e and faces a
probability (1-z) of being detected, in which case the amount Sm is
confiscated. Denoting the domestic price by m' expected profits in domestic
currency are a weighted average of profits in the two states of nature:
(1) p =z(P(L +S )- eP*tL -eP*S]+(1-z)(P L -P*t L -eP*S m m m m mmmmm mm mmm mm
Now the probability of detection is an increasing function of the
smuggling activity, which can be written as the probability of success, z,
being a decreasing function of the smuggling ratio, Sm:—4—
(2) z =z(s);z' <0
Sm =
z(0)=1
If the z function is concave (z" <0),the probability of success in
smuggling decreases fast as some of it is undertaken and then more and more
slowly as the smuggling ratio rises so that as Sm -, z—'0.Alternatively,
if 1'0, z reaches zero for some value Sm* For example, if z =1-
asm,then
=1/a.
We write profits in terms of the import good valued at the official
exchange rate. Defining the endogenous markup of the domestic price over the
world price and the black market premium, we get:
(3) p =pIeP*=zS +L -tL -pS mm mmm mm mm m
where m = the price markup; and p =e/,the black market premium.
First-order conditions for profit maximization can be solved for the
optimal combination of the import price markup and smuggling ratio, given the
tariff and the black market premium:
(4) [1 — =t m m m
(5) m1m) =p
where m =-z's/z
According to (4), the domestic price is greater than the world price in
domestic currency valued at the official rate but less than the tariff-
inclusive price (1 <m
<tm)•This is what Pitt (1984) calls "price disparity."-5-
It is clear from (5), furthermore, that the z function must be such that cm <
We assume that this condition is satisfied at the optimum, which implies in the
earlier example that Sm < 1/2a.
The second-order condition for a maximum has the sign of:
(6) 8m =
wherem =_Z"Sm/ZI
The condition Bm0 is met when < 2, which will always be true when
z"0. We assume that this is the case. Note that Bm(O) =2z'(O)and that in
the linear case, Bm =
Atthe optimum, profits are zero, as can be checked by substituting (4)
and (5) into (1). Using the zero—profit condition to solve for the





eP* m l+zs m
According to (7), the domestic price markup is a weighted average of the
tariff and the premium relative to the probability of success, with the weight
on the tariff falling as the equilibrium smuggling ratio increases.




An alternative interpretation of (8) is that it expresses the first-order
condition for the minization of m in (7), which is equivalent to the prof it—
maximization carried out earlier, as noted by Pitt (1984).
The combination of the domestic price and the smuggling ratio consistent—6-
with maximum profit for the importer can be presented graphically as the LLm
locus given by (4) and the SSm locus given by (5). Their slopes are given by:
d Bsmmm
ds 'LL — , 2 mm 1-zsm
-BRmm
ds 'SS —z+z's m m m
We see from (9) that the LL locus is downward sloping. A higher
smuggling ratio of imports implies a lower domestic price markup, because
otherwise profits from legal trade would rise. Conversely, (10) shows that
the SS locus is upward sloping. A higher smuggling ratio of imports implies a
higher domestic price markup, because otherwise profits from smuggling would
fall. The numerators of (9) and (10) have the inverse signs from the effect
of an increase in the smuggling ratio of imports on marginal profits from
legal trade and smuggling respectively. Denoting these by L and
respectively in Figure 1, right panel, we see that above SSm(LLm) profits
from smuggling (legal trade) are rising and conversely. When reaches the
value for which m =1,say ,theslope of the SSm curve becomes vertical.
In the linear example, this will happen at =3a.
It is clear from Figure 1 that there always exists a solution -if tm >P
Note also that smuggling reduces the price markup but cannot eliminate it,
even if p =1.
An increase in the import tariff raises the domestic price markup and the
smuggling ratio less than proportionately. On the other hand, an increase in
the black market premium raises the domestic price of the imported good and-
Figure1









lowers the smuggling ratio of imports.
2.The Exporter
The choice problem of the exporter can be analyzed in a similar set—up.
Assuming the same detection technology, as captured by the z function, and
indexing the variables with x, profits in domestic currency are given by
(11) p =zSp*e + P* L -P(S +L ) xxxx xxx x x
where t, =1- theexport tax; and z =z(s),with the properties
indicated in (2) above.
Defining the international terms of trade T*, we can express profits in
units of the import good as:
(12) x =[zSp+ tL -xx+LxflT*
where T* =P*/P*;and =p/P* x m x xx
The first—order conditions are again solved to obtain the optimal
combination of the domestic price of exports and the share of legal exports,
given the export tax and the premium:
(13) =t—pz's2
(14) =pz(l_CX)
The second-order condition is still given by (6) above (with5x replacing
Sm) and, at the optimum, exporters' profits are also zero, the domestic price
being given by:—8-
(15) =(t+zPs)/(1+s)
Now isagaina weighted average of t< and pz, with =t/(1+s)
when s reaches s>. Note, however, that, as before, the elasticity will
become negative at a lower value, s•




Again, (16) is simply the first-order condition for the maximization of
in (15). Now, since p and are both positive, we have a stronger
condition on the elasticity of the z function, namely that r<1, where
= ) canbe interpreted as the ratio of the elasticity to the weight
of the export tax in (15), which is larger than one when there is export
smuggling. We assume that this condition is met at the optimum, so that
S < where r(sx) =0.In the linear case =)'+/a-1.
For the exporter, the LL locus slopes upward and the SS< locus slopes
downward, as shown in Figure 1, left panel. Once again, above LLX(SSX)
profits from legal trade (smuggling) are positive and conversely. From a
point on LLxi an increase in the smuggling ratio for exports requires a rise
in the domestic price markup, otherwise profits from legal trade would fall.
From a point on SS,a fall in the domestic price markup is required,
otherwise profits from smuggling would rise. Again, there always exists a
solution if p > 1 > t<. Depending on the equilibrium smuggling, the price
markup may be larger or smaller than one. When > 1, the domestic price of
the export good is larger than the world price despite export taxation.
An increase in the export tax raises the price and lowers the smuggling—9—
ratio for exports, whereas an increase in the premium raises both.
3.The (Flow) Determination of the Black Market Premium
Identifying smuggled imports from many identical importers as (flow)
demand for black market foreign exchange and undetected smuggled exports from
many identical exports as (flow) supply of black market foreign exchange, the
first-order conditions can be used to determine the black market premium. We
then have from (4) and (5) that:
(17) p =tmm(sm)
where m =z(1C);sgn m' =sgnB <0
1-z'
Given the tariff, when the premium rises, demand for black market foreign
exchange falls. Note that m1 as long as <1and that m(0) =1.
Similarly, from (13) and (14), we get:
(18) p =txx(sx)
—x where x =1/z(1-ç); sgn x' =-sgnBx >0.
Note that Sx cannot be so large as to make x negative because of the
condition that <1.Also x =1when s =0.Given the export tax, when
the premium rises, supply of black market foreign exchange rises (the share of
legal exports falls).
In equilibrium, legal exports (in foreign currency) equal legal imports
(in foreign currency) and undetected smuggled exports equal total smuggled




Dividing (20) by (19), we obtain a relationship between sm and Sx:
(21) =Z(5x)Sx
The rise in the export smuggling ratio is always larger than the rise in
the import smuggling ratio. This is because detected smuggled exports are
confiscated before they can be exchanged for smuggled imports, so that a less
than one probability of success in export smuggling is equivalent to the real
cost of smuggling featured in Pitt (1984) and Martin and Panagariya (1984).
Thus, when smuggling is virtually non-existent, then 55m but, as the
share of smuggled exports rises, we get 5m < Sx and the gap keeps growing as
Sx increases. Note that 5m must be such that Z(Sx)Sx is non-zero.
From (17), (18), and (21), we can simultaneously determine the black
market premium, the share of smuggled exports and the share of smuggled
imports. In Figure 2, top panel, the XX locus slopes upward from t and the
MM locus slopes downward from tm They intersect at E. An increase in the
tariff increases the demand for black market foreign exchange which results in
a rise in the premium and in the smuggling ratios (SS locus in bottom panel).
An increase in the export tax increases the supply of black market foreign
exchange: the premium falls but both smuggling ratios still rise. Thus
higher trade taxes induce smuggling, but their effect on the black market
premium depends on whether they affect supply or demand. Note that the SS
schedule becomes flat when Sx =5x'where > such that Sm =Z(Sx)Sx
The effects of capital flight or of a legal trade deficit are-
Figure2






straightforward to analyze. Thus, an undetected capital outflow k =K/Lm
raises m(sm+k) and thus the MM locus shifts up in Figure 2. This raises p and
S (from s° to sk). In (21), though, we now have Sm =zs
-k,so that the
SS locus also shifts up and s falls from s0 to
m m m
By totally differentiating (17), (18) and (21), denoting proportional
rates of change by hats and the (positive) elasticities of the x and m
functions by €1(i =x,m), we obtain the black market premium as a weighted
average of tm and t:
(22) p =(la)tm+ at
m m x x—x x —x x where a =e/(c + ); c =(2- )/(1—c )(1-C ); and
Note that > with equality holding when Sm == 0.A premium in
this limiting case requires different detection technologies for imports and
exports. Otherwise, the initial situation may be tm =t
=p=1and then
=ex=—2z'(O).
The smuggling ratios only depend on the ratio of one plus the trade tax
rates, t =tm/tx•Note that changes both in the export tax and in the import
tariff have the same effect on t (when Tx =
Tm
=0initially), as required by




Note that the analysis is applicable when instead of an export tax, we
have an export subsidy, as in Branson and Macedo (1986). In that case,—12-
taxes and subsidies rising at the same rate would keep t and thus Sm and
s constant but would nevertheless imply a rising black market premium from
(22).
4.Trade Taxes and Relative Prices
Having obtained Sm 5 and p, we obtain prices from the zero profit
conditions in (7) and (15) above. Log differentiating those, we get:
(7") =t +a$t mm m
(15") =t+(1—a)t
where m =PSm/(tm+PSm)and =psz/(t+psz).
Trade taxes have a direct (and proportional) effect on price markups
since these markups are tax-inclusive. But we see in (7") and (15") that
there is also an indirect effect through the changes in smuggling ratios
induced by changes in relative trade taxes. An increase in the import
smuggling ratio decreases the tax-exclusive import price markup, because the
lower probability of success lowers demand for black market foreign exchange
and thus requires a lower black market premium for profits not to fall.
Conversely, an increase in the export smuggling ratio increases the
tax-exclusive export price markup, because the lower probability of success
lowers supply of black market foreign exchange and thus requires a higher
black market premium for profits not to fall. On both counts, therefore,
trade taxes increase the export relative to the import markup, net of taxes.-13-
The effect of smuggling ratios on the relative price ii =X'mcan be
seen from the difference between (7") and (15"):
(25) it =T-
wherew =CX(1_x)+ £m(l+m).
Since tm >tand therefore > andsince >
€mas well,
<+ C andthe effect of t on itisless than proportional. If
=
5m
=initially, however, it will be proportional.
5.A Model of the Economy
Having obtained the equilibrium values of p, S,Smand it,weneed a
model of the economy to determine total imports, exports, production,
consumption and welfare. Defining a production possibilities frontier in
terms of importables and exportables (net of enforcement costs), an homothetic
social welfare function in terms of the consumption of the two goods, setting
it equal to production plus imports and less exports respectively, and making
total imports equal to total exports at world prices yields the total amount
imported as a function of the relative price, it.Thisexercise is carried out
in Martin and Panagariya (1984) and, for this purpose, the model of the black
market presented above could be grafted onto their model of the economy.
We present here a slightly different model, which allows for the
existence of a non-traded good. As in Jones (1974) we assume that there is
neither domestic production of the import good nor domestic consumption of the
export good. As a consequence, the production possibilities frontier and the




We neglect the distributional consequences of trade taxes and assume that
revenues from detected smuggling are consumed by the government. Then
consumption equals production in the market for the non—traded good and any
decrease in export production will raise welfare via the extra consumption of
the non—traded good:
(28) =
Efficiency in production implies that the price of exports in terms of
non—traded goods equals the marginal rate of transformation:
(29) q = f"<0
where q =x'nt•
Efficiency in consumption implies that the price of imports in terms of
non—traded goods (given by q/i) is a negative function, denoted by g, of the
consumption ratio (assuming unitary income elasticities, so that the marginal
and average propensities to import are the same): eliminating q from (29) and
using the trade balance equilibrium, we obtain an equation in Lmg i,Sm ands:
(30) =ng(C/f(Q)]
where Cm =Lm(l4ZSm)and =Lm(l+sx)/T*.
Log differentiating (30), we see that the domestic terms of trade
increases with import consumption and export production:—15—
(30') (?l÷c9c)Q + e9C =
whereg =_g'C/fg,the inverse of the aggregate elasticity of substitution
in demand, = the inverse of the elasticity of production
f f ff
(similarly for on-traded goods), and e =-f'Q/f
=i Inn.
We note from the definitions of Cm and in (30) that (realized) import
demand excludes the amount confiscated by the government, whereas production
of exports includes the amount confiscated by the government. The effect of
trade taxes given Lm is thus to raise Cm and but the latter by more:
(31) CmL + mmY1t
(32) x =L+ (fI(Ex+m)]t -
Nowsubstituting in (31) for Cmi and itfrom(32), (32') and (25),
respectively, we can solve for the legal amount of imports as a function of
the international terms of trade and trade taxes:
(33) [(i÷€) + =(l÷+fl)T*- x +
£
Theterm in square brackets includes the price effect w as well as a
quantity effect. Both are negative and less than proportional if
< (Cx+Cm). If =
Sm
=0initially, the total effect will be one-to-one
(in absolute value).
A deterioration in the terms of trade lowers legal imports (as well as
legal exports). When utility is Cobb-Douglas, (c9 =1),they fall in
proportion.
Using (33) in (32) and (32'), we obtain the effect of trade taxes on—16—
import consumption and export production. Leaving out the terms of trade
(T* =0),we have:
(31') E(Ex+em)cm =-[w+ )]t
(32') E(€x+em)Q =
whereE =(1+f)+
We see from (31') that import consumption falls by less than legal
imports, and from (32') that trade taxes need not depress export production
and shift resources to the production of non-traded goods. This requires a
large c9, or a small aggregate elasticity of substitution in demand.
From (29), the relative price of exports and non-traded goods is
positively related to x• The effect of the terms of trade is given by
Thus, if the aggregate elasticity of substitution in demand is
greater than one, then < 1 and a terms of trade deterioration raises the
domestic price of exports relative to non-traded goods. There is no effect in
the Cobb-Douglas case. The effect of trade taxes will tend to be negative so
that the price of exports falls relative to the price of non-traded goods. We
see from (32'), however, that the effect could be positive if c is large
enough.
Coming to the welfare effects, we differentiate (27) and choose units so
that au/acm =1:
(34) -dU =amC + (lam)Ct
where am =PmCm/Pntyithe share of imports in consumption; and y = +
nt
real income.
Since a terms of trade improvement reduces x and thus increases
C while raising Lm from (33), its effect on welfare is unambiguously—17—
positive. The effect of trade taxes is ambiguous, though, because of the
ambiguity of the effect on If falls, rises and so does welfare





Thisreduces to the condition that the term in square brackets in (32')
be positive when am =0.Otherwise, it is more likely to happen when is
large and and c are small. Thus the relative magnitude of the supply
and demand elasticities and the consumption share of imports are what
introduces this ambiguity, absent from the model of Martin and Panagariya
(1984), where tariffs are welfare-reducing because of the ex ante deficit in
the total trade balance. While, in the present model, it is also the case
that + < Lm+Smallowing for the existence of a non-traded good
introduces the possibility of a positive effect, at least under the extreme
assumption that government activities are improductive and that the
authorities react passively. Instead of introducing the choice of the
government with respect to trade taxes and enforcement, however, we allow
asset stocks to determine the black market premium at each instant of time.
6.A Portfolio Model of the Black Market for Foreign Exchange
In the previous section, we neglected the existence of the stock demand
for foreign assets which was introduced in Macedo (1982). It can be written
as:-18-
(36) pF =Ad
where F is the given stock of foreign assets (in foreign currency) and Ad is
the given demand for foreign assets valued at the official exchange rate.
The stock of foreign assets changes with the unreported current account.
Denoting rates of change by dots:
. * *
(37) F=B=(TZS-S)P x mm
Dividing by the amounts of legal trade and assuming for the moment that
the reported trade balance is zero, we get
* * -1 -1
(38) B =PL{Tz(s)x (p/tx] -
m
(P/tm])
Even though a rise in p raises and therefore lowers z, the direct
effect always dominates since the elasticity is less than one, so that we can
rewrite (37) and (38) as:
(39) F
The sign of the first term makes the system stable and retrieves the
"acceleration hypothesis" of Kouri (1983) in the analysis of the black market
for foreign exchange:
(40) p =-B/F
The premium will rise when the unreported current account is in deficit
(B <0)and conversely. A rise in tariffs will generate a deficit (and
increase the premium as before), whereas a rise in export taxes will generate
a surplus.-19--
Since the black market premium is determined by (36) at each moment in




Using (41) and (42), we can rewrite (38) as:
(38') BpSm((cm+cx)/cxHp(1_a)tx -atm]
Comparing to (22) above, when the premium is above the long-run value
given by the a-weighted average of trade taxes, the reported trade balance is
in surplus and conversely.
To relax the assumption made earlier that the reported trade balance is
always zero, and therefore allow for changes in domestic money, consider the
following extension. Portfolio balance is now written as
(36') pF =hi
wherei= H/is the stock of domestic money valued at the official exchange
rate
and h is the given currency ratio (obtained from the asset demand
function).
While domestic credit creation and a given rate of crawl for the official
exchange rate are easy to incorporate, see Macedo (1985), we neglect them in
order to identify the reported trade balance with the rate of increase of
domestic money:—20-
* *
(43) H=B=PL -PL xx mm
Using (37) and (43) we see that the premium changes with the difference
between the normalized unreported and reported trade balances:
(44) p =-(B/F)+CB/H)
The premium will change if the unreported trade deficit is different from
the reported trade surplus weighted by the currency ratio valued at the
official exchange rate i =F/H,which will always be smaller than the
currency ratio relevant for portfolio choice since h =p1.




where E. = I=x,m<1.
Since trade is not balanced, however, we simultaneously determine Lm and








=*[•• /P*L xx mm
and A =P*L((1+e'+)c +
Notethat when=1,we get back to the original expression. An
increase in the premium will decrease legal trade and conversely. Increases
in trade taxes unambiguously reduce legal trade, and an increase in the trade
surplusincreases exports and lowers imports. A devaluation of the official
rate, by lowering the premium, will increase both exports and imports, such
that the net effect is zero. Nevertheless, the effect of the official
exchange rate on the reported trade balance should be explicitly introduced.
Conclusion
This model can easily be extended to allow for wealth effects, along the
lines of Macedo (1985). Despite its simplicity, it captures the basic
relationship between currency inconvertibility, trade taxes and smuggling.
In particular it shows that, even when trade is balanced, the existence of a
black market premium and non-traded goods allows for the possibility of trade
taxes not reducing welfare. The model did not make the usual assumption that
there were real costs to smuggling activity, except for the possibility of
detection. It shows that the black market premium Is a weighted average of
trade taxes, thus providing current account transactions as the fundamental
determinants of the long-run free exchange rate.
The model can also be enriched by specifying the choice of the government
with respect to the enforcement of exchange controls and the detection of tax-22—
evasion. Most important, however, would be the explicit consideration of
monetary and exchange rate policy, which is pushed to the background by
assuming that legal trade is balanced at the prevailing official exchange
rate. Some of these extensions are in our current research agenda.—23-
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